

Table of Contents

NAMIBIA ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

OBSERVATIONS

- II.1 Current Environment
 - II.1.a. Political and security environment
 - II.1.b. Humanitarian/economic environment

- II.2 The landmine/UXO threat
 - II.2.a. Origin of the problem
 - II.2.b. Current situation

- II.3 The consequences of the presence of Mines/UXO
 - II.3.a. Mine/UXO accidents
 - II.3.b. Humanitarian and socio-economic impact

- II.4 Capacities and current activities that deal with the problem
 - II.4.a. Detection and clearance
 - II.4.b. Mine awareness
 - II.4.c. Victim assistance
 - II.4.d. Advocacy and international conventions

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- III.1. Conclusions
 - III.1.a. General
 - III.1.b. Ban on landmines
 - III.1.c. Victim assistance
 - III.1.d. Mine awareness
 - III.1.e. Mine clearance
 - III.1.f. National Mine-action Structure

- III.2. Recommendations
 - III.2.a. General
 - III.2.b. Ban on landmines
 - III.2.c. Victim assistance
 - III.2.d. Mine awareness
 - III.2.e. Mine clearance
 - III.2.f. National Mine-action Structure

Annex A: Terms of Reference

LIST OF ACRONYMS

APM	Anti-personnel mines
ATM	Anti-tank mines
EC	European Commission
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS	Geographic Information System
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
LRC	Landmines Resource Centre
MGM	Menschen Gegen Minen
MPS	Members of Parliament
NBA	Namibian Blasting Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHRP	National Human Resource Plan
NMAP	Namibia Mine Action Plan
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
SADC	Southern Africa Development Committee
SADF	South African Defence Forces
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WHO	World Health Organisation

NAMIBIA ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The origin of the mine problem in Namibia is linked to the presence of South African military forces up until 1980, and to the Namibian war of independence. During these periods of conflict, both the South African Defence Forces (SADF) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) used anti-personnel mines for protective and harassment purposes.

The landmine situation in Namibia constitutes neither a humanitarian emergency nor a major obstacle for development. However, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) contamination does jeopardise inhabitants and livestock in the three provinces in the northern region of the country.

The minefields, also located in the north, are well known and well recorded, but clearance operations have had to be repeated in many areas due to varied standards. The landmine and UXO situation does not constitute a governmental priority, as it does not hamper any major development activities. Mine victims are also relatively few, especially in comparison to other governmental health and social concerns such as unemployment and HIV/AIDS.

Mine action activities have, to date, focused mainly on clearance and mine awareness and have been almost solely supported by the United States (U.S. Military and the contractor Force XXI). However, this programme of assistance was scheduled to expire at the end of March 2000. The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) has been given a Government mandate to clear landmines, whilst the Explosives Department of the Police has been tasked with UXO clearance.

The mine problem in Namibia is finite, well known and could be solved relatively quickly given the appropriate resources and co-ordination. Therefore, Namibia could become the first, or one of the first, mine-affected countries to declare itself mine free. In this regard, Namibia could be an example to other mine-affected countries in the region.

BACKGROUND

From 1966 to 1980, Namibia was involved in a low level guerrilla war, in which Anti Personnel Mines (APM) were used. This conflict typically involved “hit and run tactics” by the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) - the military wing of SWAPO - and counterinsurgency operations against PLAN by the South African Defence Forces (SADF). Landmines are known to have been used by both the SADF and PLAN during this period.

The landmine problem is relatively well defined as the SADF provided full minefield records before leaving the country in 1989. In addition, South Africa undertook some clearance activities on minefields they had laid, however for a variety of reasons this was not carried out to an acceptable standard, resulting in a requirement for additional clearance operations.

In addition to the landmine problem, Namibia is also affected by large numbers of UXO located around the former SADF bases as a result of conflict in these areas. The problem of abandoned munitions and UXO is estimated to pose a far greater threat to Namibians than landmines.

In September 1999, following consultations with its UN partners, the United Nations Mine Action service (UNMAS), acting in its capacity as the focal point for all mine-related activities within the UN system, offered to organize a multidisciplinary, inter-agency mission to assess the scope of and impact of the landmine/UXO problem, and to identify any requirement for UN assistance.

The assessment mission was led by Mr. Hemi Morete, the UNOPS Liaison Officer to UNMAS, and included the following members: Mr. Leon Terblanche, Mine Action Specialist, UNDP; Mr. Herve Petetin, Operation Analysis, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD); Mr. Wolfgang Hirsch, Study Group, GICHD.

The team met in Windhoek with Government representatives and with members of the Swedish, German and U.S. Embassies. It consulted with UN agencies, international NGOs, and commercial companies operating in Namibia, and met with other national and international entities involved in mine action. These included inter alia: UNDP, the United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), Orthopaedic Centre, Force XXI, People against Landmines (MgM) and the Namibian Police Explosives Department.

OBSERVATIONS

II.1 Current Environment

II.1.a. Political and Security Environment

The constitution of 1990 established Namibia as an independent republic, with the President as the executive branch, elected by popular vote. Legislative authority is vested in the National Assembly; a body made up of 72 elected members and up to 6 appointed representatives. The National Council, made up of two representatives from each of Namibia's 13 regional councils, acts as an advisory body.

In 1994, the first elections following Namibian independence were held, with SWAPO winning 53 out of 72 seats in the National Assembly, and the opposition securing 15 seats. Following national elections in December 1999, the current political situation is as follows: President Sam Nujoma finished with some 77% of the total votes, Congress of Democrats (COD) president Ben Ulenga came in second with 11%, and Katutire Kaura, president of Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) obtained 10% of the total. Therefore, in the National Assembly, SWAPO has 76% of the total with 55 Members of Parliament in the national assembly. COD has 10% making it the official opposition in the National Assembly, and DTA claimed 9%. With 19% of the ballot, both the COD and DTA have 7 seats in the new National Assembly while the other parties did not get enough votes for a parliamentary seat. These elections confirm the predominance of SWAPO in Namibia, but newer opposition parties are gaining in support.

Following an assault on police and radio stations in the town Katima Mulilo by separatists in which 16 people were killed, President Nujomma declared a "state of emergency" from 3 August 1999 until further notice in the Caprivi province. The political opposition in this area, led by Mishake Muyongo, is demanding autonomy for this province.

The ongoing war in Angola also continues to play a destabilising role in Namibia due to cross-border activities conducted by UNITA. In addition, this province was the staging area for SADF operations into Angola in the 1980s, and Caprivi residents were considered to be supporting the SADF activities by many Namibians. This situation has led to poor relations between Caprivi residents and the central government, with 2500 people fleeing the country in 1999 from this area. UNHCR is now dealing with their repatriation from Botswana, whilst the Government is continuing efforts to counter suspected secessionists.

II.1.b. Humanitarian/Economic Environment

Namibia suffers from a number of major health problems including childhood diseases such as diarrhoea and respiratory infections, high rates of maternal and infant mortality, pneumonia, malaria and tuberculosis. However, HIV/AIDS has become the leading cause of death, killing as many people as malaria and tuberculosis combined, and having a significant impact on the local socio-economic situation.

Estimated number of people living with AIDS (end of 1997)	150,000
Total estimated number of deaths due to AIDS	14,000
Death linked with AIDS in 1997	6,000
<i>Estimated number of mine/UXO victims (total)</i>	<i>351</i>
<i>Number of mine/UXO victims per year (approx.)</i>	<i>35</i>

HIV/AIDS is considered to be the country's greatest threat to development, as reported in the *UNDP Namibia Human Development Report, 1998*. HIV/AIDS-affected life expectancy in the 1995-2000 period is recorded as 42.4 years, while it is 61.3 years for those unaffected according to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Life expectancy may also continue reducing to a predicted level of 40.6 years during the period 2000-2005. The government is reported to be doing everything possible to educate the people about the danger posed by AIDS.

Unemployment is also a significant social problem, with a sharp increase in recent years from 19 per cent in 1991, to 32.9 per cent in 1993, and to 34.8 per cent in 1997. Most of those unemployed are of limited education with poor skills, with 38 per cent of them aged between 15-24 according to national statistics from the National Human Resource Plan (NHRP). A private office: H&E Labour Consultants has also stated that by 1996 combined adult unemployment and underemployment had reached 60 per cent of the labour force. In addition, each year, new entrants to the labour market are estimated at 20,000.

Another critical issue is income distribution, despite the per-capita-income of \$2,220 (1997) being more than four times the average for sub-Saharan Africa and putting it at the level of some lower middle-income East European countries. However, this figure masks extreme inequality in the distribution pattern, with the richest one per cent of households consuming as much as the poorest 50 per cent. The white minority, which constitutes most of the land and major business owners, is within this top percentile, while the black majority is at the bottom.

Recognising that Namibia has still a long way to go in building up an equitable society, it can be considered that the first nine years of independence have produced the potential for further economic growth and security within an environment of relatively peaceful democracy.

II.2 The Landmine/UXO Threat

II.2.a. The Origin of the Problem

Since 1966, the low-level guerrilla war in Namibia saw APM use by both the SWAPO military wing: the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and the counterinsurgency operations against the guerrillas by the SADF.

◆ *Mines Planted by the SADF:*

Nine South African Defense Force military bases were built in Kaokoveld, Owambo, Kawango and Caprivi in the northern areas of the country. As infiltration intensified in the latter years of the conflict, protective anti-personnel minefields were laid around these military bases. Three water

towers and the town of Ruacana were also mined by the SADF. During this period, 353,510 square meters were mined by the SADF with 44,594 APMs, each minefield plan was recorded, and all perimeter fences were plotted.¹

Minefields	Mines laid by SADF
Ruacana	8796
Hurricane	7564
Omahanege	8259
Okalongo	4160
Ombalantu	2326
Ohangwena	1991
Charlie Tower	3978
Eenhana	5094
Etale	5426
Total	47594

In 1980, 401 high-tension power pylons for the electricity supply-line providing Windhoek and other locations with electricity were mined. This power line runs from the hydroelectric power plant in Ruacana to the Werda gate, along the western border of the Etosha National Game Park. The minefields were planted by the SADF at the request of the South West African Water and Electricity Commission (SWAWEC, renamed Nampower). At independence, these minefields remained the responsibility of SWAWEC and were not cleared by the SADF, but were left with fences and markings in serviceable condition. Detailed records of every minefield were handed over to SWAWEC.

◆ *Mines planted by SWAPO*

SWAPO carried out sporadic and limited mining operations utilising mainly POMZ anti-personnel mines and TMA3 anti-tank mines. There was no pattern or recording of the mined areas, with many simply being dumped in the border areas by rebel forces returning to Angola. The total number of these mines is estimated to be in the order of several hundred.

◆ *Mine Types*

The most common mines planted in Namibia were the TMA 3, J 69, R2M2 and POMZ. Additionally, Namibia is affected by widespread UXO contamination located primarily around former SADF bases, a result of their protective fire plans and fighting in close proximity to these locales.

II.2.b. Current situation

In May 1992, the NDF were officially tasked to conduct clearance of all of the minefields throughout the country. This was commenced in the vicinity of the nine SADF base minefields but due to variable standards of clearance, a number of mine incidents occurred. In 1994, the U.S. started an assistance programme providing an eight-week training course to the NDF, with the recommencing of clearance operations in 1995. In April 1998, the NDF officially declared the SADF minefields as “cleared”.

¹ Namibian MOD sources

In July 1993, a private contractor, Namibian Blasting Agents (NBA), officially took over the responsibility for clearing minefields along the Ruacana power line, but performed the task extremely poorly, at a cost of 3.4 million Rand (approx. 1 million USD at 1993 rates).

The NBA methods were unconventional and bordered on negligent. Rather than using existing minefield records to locate and destroy APMs, NBA used a bulldozer to excavate the soil around each pylon to a depth of 30 cm. This soil was pushed into mounds of soil, or “berms”, on which a warning sign was placed, these berms contain the majority of the APMs from around the pylons. In addition, there are unconfirmed reports that six pylons were not cleared at all.

In 1994, the U.S. Department of Defence visited the country and provided mine clearance training assistance. In February 1995, a Memorandum of Co-operation was signed between the two countries. Following this agreement, a US Military training team conducted an eight-week course, which according to U.S. reports in 1997 had trained 135 deminers, and 20 EOD and 20 paramedics. The U.S. also assisted in the establishment of a National Demining Liaison Committee (NDLC) to co-ordinate the national program. This was intended as an inter-ministerial policy and advisory body, but only met a limited number of times and does not function any longer. Assistance also includes that of Force XXI in providing guidance to the NDF in clearance operations.

A second clearance of the Ruacana power line is currently being conducted by the NDF, with assistance from the U.S. Company “Force XXI”. To date they have reported the demining of more than 200 pylons, and at current rates would complete the pylon clearance in December 2000. The unique nature of the problem (mine bulldozed into berms) has resulted in somewhat unconventional clearance methods, but the assessment team considers the approach to be generally sound. The Force XXI SOP should be reviewed however, to ensure that they comply with the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations.

To date, the UN system has not been involved with mine action, although UNICEF has been actively involved with the Mine Ban Treaty ratification process. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) also does not reflect assistance in mine action, while there is not Target for Resource Assignment for the Core (TRAC) funding available for such activities.

The government has also been accused of stockpiling mines and munitions (6000 tons of explosives and ammunition, including an unknown number of APMs) at Grootfontein military base, under storage conditions that have been described as extremely poor and potentially environmentally dangerous. The Assessment Team was unable to confirm this allegation.

The Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) has constituted a Mine Action Committee to co-ordinate activities within the region, with several projects funded and backed up by European Commission (EC) being underway, notably involving management training, victim assistance and reintegration, mine databases, and technology. SADC offices are located

in Botswana, and meetings with regional representatives are organised on a regular basis through the SADC Mine Action Committee.

There was concern amongst the team that the potential exists for duplication of effort between these regional SADC initiatives and those underway already internationally, such as the UNMAS-coordinated Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and UNDP-led management training.

II.3 The Impact of Mines/UXO

II.3.a. Mine/UXO Accidents

The Office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives maintains records of accidents and victims dating back to 1989. The records indicate that over the last ten years 107 people have been killed and 255 injured by mines and/or UXO. The data shows that 86.9% of all accidents can be attributed to UXO and not landmines.

The records also show that mines and UXO accidents particularly affect two cross-sections of the population; young males from 5 to 15, and males above the age of 22. This is assessed to be due to the younger victims tampering with UXO, whilst adult males collect UXO for sale to scrap dealers.

Region	Accidents	Region	Accident
Oshana	71	Omati	69
Ohangwena	68	Kunene	39
Otjikoto	36	Okavango	31
Khomas	11	Otjozondjupa	11
Caprivi	9	Omaheke	2
Erongo	2	Karas	1
Hardap	1	Total	362

II.3.b. Humanitarian and Socio-Economic Impact

Although two thirds of the population currently live in the northern part of the country, accidents remain relatively rare. However, mines and UXO constitute a real threat to the rural population, especially stock herders. As mentioned above, adolescent boys and younger males are the most affected members of the population and constitute the primary at-risk group. Additionally, the mines and UXO have an impact upon the fragile economic balance of rural communities when cattle are killed or injured.

At a national level, economic development is relatively unaffected by mines and UXO. This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that none of the representatives of embassies interviewed by the team commented on any adverse effects caused by mines or UXO. The number of injuries and disabilities resulting from landmines is also limited when compared to other causes of trauma; consequently no particular institution exists in the country to deal exclusively with the victims of landmines.

II.4 Capacities and Current Activities Dealing with the Problem

II.4.a. Detection and Clearance

The Namibian Government has divided clearance responsibilities between the NDF and the Police Explosives Department. Initially, this was planned to allow the NDF to deal with military areas while police took care of civilian problem areas. This approach has since been modified, with the NDF being responsible for landmines, whilst the Police deal with UXO.

The Explosives Division of the Department of the Police, within the Ministry of Home Affairs, retains the function of Chief Inspector of Explosives. Under the provisions of the local Explosives Act, the Chief is responsible for *“inspection of and licensing of explosives magazines...; rendering safe destruction of improvised explosive devices (bomb disposal); destruction of explosives (also high explosive ammunition EOD); investigation of explosions ..; investigation of accidents caused by the ignition of explosives or its ingredients; ...”*. This responsibility refers to all areas not under military control including the former military area in North Namibia as well as the power lines.

However, despite this official distribution of responsibilities, it appears that in the field, the delineation of responsibility between the NDF and the Office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives remains unclear. This results in an uncoordinated response and a rivalry that could hamper future activities. To date, the NDF have cleared the protective minefields around the former SADF bases and are now clearing the Ruacana power line with U.S. assistance.

To carry out the UXO clearance mission in the northern part of Namibia Colonel Theyse, the Chief Inspector of Explosives, has at his disposal one EOD team composed of 5 people. This lack of resourcing is hampering the effectiveness of this office.

II.4.b. Mine Awareness

Three major mine awareness campaigns have been conducted to date; in 1990, 1994 and 1998, with the involvement of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and some U.S. assistance.

October 1990 saw the instigation of the first Namibian Police mine awareness campaign, with the Ministry of Home Affairs bringing together several other ministries to organise and launch an effective campaign intended to inform the public about the danger of UXO. Additionally, extremely good co-operation from radio stations, national TV and national and international newspapers has gone some way in focussing international attention on mine and UXO dangers in the north. This campaign is believed to have been effective in reducing the number of casualties.

In 1994, the Government launched a second campaign, which included distribution of pamphlets and T-shirts warning the public about the danger of explosives, with funding support of \$1.5 million from the U.S.

In September 1998, the Ministries of Information and Broadcasting, and Defence launched another campaign distributing numerous risk awareness items with technical and financial assistance from the U.S.

In addition to these campaigns, the NDF and the Office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives normally provides mine awareness education when working in the field. However, this activity lacks adequate coordination and is not in accordance with UNICEF international guidelines.

A Mine Awareness Committee was created in 1995, comprising of different national ministries and UNICEF, but has never played a strong co-ordinating role that was expected.

II.4.c. Victim Assistance

Because of the limited number of mine and UXO victims, there is no specific mine victim assistance program in place. There is however a lack of information exchange between the various partners dealing in the general health sector. The state does provide free rehabilitation, but due to a general lack of resources, victims can expect to wait for long periods before having their needs addressed.

The national infrastructure for prosthetic activities is composed of one major hospital in Windhoek and two smaller ones in Oshakati and Rundu. These institutions suffer from a lack of equipment and training for the staff. As a result, the rate of production of prostheses is inadequate, as is the product quality.

There are also very few established reintegration programs, resulting in most victims becoming a burden on their families.

II.4.d. Advocacy and International Conventions

Namibia signed the Mine Ban Convention on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 21 July 1998. Official government releases state that Namibia does not produce antipersonnel mines, has never exported them and has completed destruction of all APMs except those retained for training, as permitted by the Convention. However, in July 1998, the Government organised the destruction of fifty tons of landmines and time-expired ordnance, although this included large numbers of ATM and UXO. The total number of APMs destroyed is unknown. In addition, no independent body was invited to witness the destruction and the Namibian Ministry of Defence still refuses to divulge the number, types and storage locations of the mines they have retained for training.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

III.1. Conclusions

III.1.a. General

- ◆ Namibia is facing a limited, well known and manageable mine problem. Therefore, with some adjustments to their current programmes, it is conceivable that this country could become mine free in the near future. UXO, however, will remain a significant problem for some time;
- ◆ The requisite tools and mechanisms for an efficient response have been created; problems remain, however, with their co-ordination.

III.1.b. Detection and Clearance

- ◆ Although the initial mine problem was small and manageable, the way it was addressed created additional, unnecessary work.
- ◆ The current national capacity (NDF and Police) is now working effectively, despite an evident lack of co-ordination. The number of deminers assigned to this mission should be reviewed with a view to expansion, in order to increase the rate of overall clearance tasks.

III.1.c. Mine Awareness

- ◆ Mine awareness to date has been conducted through two diverse methods:
 - * Large national media campaigns;
 - * Small independent and isolated initiatives.
- ◆ While the campaigns themselves may have made an immediate impact, the lack of follow-up between campaigns somewhat reduces their medium and long-term benefits. In addition, the standard message of “Don’t touch it, report it” did not achieve expected results. Indeed, most of the accidents occurred when victims threw stones at the mines to detonate them or attempted to set them on fire. The fact that mine awareness materials were also not systematically distributed in the most critical areas reduced their overall effectiveness.

III.1.d. Victim Assistance

- ◆ The few mine and UXO victims do not necessitate a specific mine victim program;
- ◆ The national capacity to produce adequate prostheses could be significantly improved.

III.1.e. Ban on Landmines

- ◆ Namibia has ratified the Mine-Ban treaty as of July 1998. However, to date, it has not yet complied with the Article 7 reporting requirements of the treaty, ie. information required within 180 days of ratification;

- ◆ A lack of transparency remains in the area of stockpile destruction.

III.1.f National Mine Action Structure

- ◆ No single entity is in charge of co-ordinating both mine and UXO clearance, despite the government mandate;
- ◆ Mine action is not part of a national development plan and consequently lacks effective impact analysis, co-ordination and prioritisation.

III.2. Recommendations

III.2.a. General

- ◆ The international community is encouraged to support:
 - Technical assistance of a limited (short) duration, drawing on best practices globally, and working with national staff to establish the mechanisms required, and to develop the current response to mines/UXO in an integrated fashion;
 - Expansion of technical aspects (use of dogs, quality management, database and EOD capacity);
 - Acquiring of equipment needed to cost-effectively address the UXO problem;
 - Completion of the overall mine clearance tasks.
- ◆ A formalised mechanism for the co-ordination and inter-action of potential donors within a national program is lacking and should be addressed. UNDP may be able to assist in this area;
- ◆ The U.S. should be requested and encouraged to continue their assistance to the NDF;
- ◆ The terms of the contract with Namibia Blasting Agents should be investigated to determine whether the contract was breached;
- ◆ It is recommended that the SADC co-ordinates more closely with UNMAS to avoid duplication of effort. In this regard, the planned development of a mine action database and a management training program for the region should be further investigated to determine whether existing mechanisms could be utilised.

III.2.b. Detection and Clearance

- ◆ The U.S. should be requested and encouraged to continue the funding of operations on the electricity pylons until completion (to date the NDF, with U.S. assistance, has cleared 205 pylons out of 400);
- ◆ The Force XXI's SOPs should be reviewed and, if necessary, updated in accordance with the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations;

- ◆ In order to speed up the hand-over of areas cleared by the NDF to local authorities, Quality Assurance in the form of a Level 3 (completion) Survey should be conducted on the nine minefields along the Angolan border in Owomboland, and the along the power line. The use of dogs for this purpose may be the most cost and time efficient means and should be investigated further;
- ◆ The NDF should investigate whether assigning more deminers (trained by the U.S. Military) to the clearance operations would improve productivity.
- ◆ As the UXO situation is by far the more significant and longer-term problem, the existing EOD capacity should be significantly expanded to a minimum of five UXO clearance teams, with the creation of a regional headquarters in the northern region to co-ordinate operations in the field;
- ◆ It is recommended that small response initiated UXO programs, coupled with mine awareness education capabilities, be created. These programmes would have the capacity to send UXO teams to a site when a report of discovery is transmitted to a police station;
- ◆ The Office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives should be given a lead role in terms of information management and quality management activities. In this regard, the UN Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) should be provided along with a Geographic Information System (GIS). In addition, this office should be designated as the focal point for formal certification and hand over procedures for cleared areas;

III.2.c. Mine Awareness

- ◆ As the mine and UXO threat is concentrated in the northern part of the country and as the mine action budget will likely remain limited, because of other priorities, it is recommended that a localised, community based, long-term awareness programme be established. This will ensure the most efficient dissemination of mine awareness messages via the headmen of each village, schoolteachers and herders;
- ◆ The population currently channels information regarding UXO to the Explosive Department through the police stations in the different villages. This network should be maintained and reinforced with the assignment of a mine awareness officer in the relevant police stations, as well as in each EOD team.
- ◆ The concept of the Mine Awareness Committee should be reappraised with a view to reducing its size. It should also be given more flexibility to enable suitable and appropriate mine awareness programs in the provinces affected by mines and UXO.

III.2.d. Victim Assistance

- ◆ UNICEF should be approached to address the problem of mine victims' reintegration;
- ◆ Adequate orthopaedic equipment should be provided and local staff trained for the two clinics in Oshakati and Rundu in the northern province as well as for the main hospital in Windhoek;

- ◆ Quality control should be established for prosthetic production activities;
- ◆ To maximise cost effectiveness, investigation of cheaper production prostheses should be conducted. (ICRC concept). ICRC should be contacted in order to examine the possibility of providing expertise for the two clinics in Oshakati and Rundu;
- ◆ Amputees, as a general rule, should receive two prostheses in order to have a permanent ability to move and work when one prosthetic is under repair.

III.2.e. Ban on Landmines

- ◆ Namibia should devise a mine action plan to meet its obligations under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. In this regard, Namibia may request further support from the UN, regional organisations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora;
- ◆ Namibia should open future stockpile destruction operations to international observers in order to provide fully transparent information.

III.2.f. National Mine Action Structure

- ◆ As no donor co-ordination currently exists for mine action, the UNDP country office should fulfil this role;
- ◆ A National Mine Action Committee (NMAP), headed by a civilian ministry, (e.g. the Ministry of Home Affairs) should be re-established, including formal mechanisms for donor interaction and co-ordination. It should also address public information and resource mobilisation strategies. Each ministry should initiate action within its own responsibility to support of the NMAP towards a co-ordinated goal. The mandate, role, composition and mode of operation of NMAP should be formally constituted;
- ◆ Under the authority of the NMAP, a working level office for UXO clearance (“UXO Namibia”) should be developed under the authority of the Chief Inspector of UXO Explosives. This office should provide co-ordination for UXO clearance activities but also information management and certification procedures for the NMAP;
- ◆ As the mine clearance tasks near completion, the use of NDF EOD-trained personnel to strengthen the EOD capacity of the police (while remaining under NDF command), should be investigated by the NDF and the Office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives.

NAMIBIA ASSESSMENT MISSION
TERMS OF REFERENCE

BACKGROUND

1. Namibia's internal struggle for independence and neighbouring conflicts has left an estimated 50,000 landmines and UXO in the ground. Today Namibian officials claim that there are no more than 4,000 uncleared AP mines in the 11 known minefields located in the far north. The remaining landmines are found in berms located around electric pylons that run from the northern town of Ruacana, near the Angolan border, 120 km south to the western part of the Etosha National Park. A 900 metre² area around each pylon was mined with about 24 to 48 APLs and four to six antitank mines. The UXO problem exists throughout the northern area where most of the fighting took place. According to the MOD 105 people have so far been killed and 246 others injured in mines and UXO explosions between June 1989 and September 1998. Namibia looks forward to becoming Africa's first mine-affected country to be declared mine-safe. Namibia has signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention.
2. The conduct of the assessment mission is in line with Resolution 52/173 of the UN General Assembly, which emphasized the important role of the United Nations in the effective coordination of activities related to mine clearance, awareness and assistance, and which urged Member States, regional organisations, governmental and non-governmental organisations, and foundations to continue to extend full assistance and cooperation to the Secretary-General.
3. The conduct of the assessment mission is also in line with the UN policy on mine action as outlined in "Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Policy".

OBJECTIVE OF THE MISSION

4. The objective of the assessment team will be to define the scope and nature of the landmine/UXO problem in Namibia, to identify constraints and opportunities relating to the development of mine action initiatives, and to make recommendations for a comprehensive response, including institutional arrangements for the coordination and implementation of mine action activities.
5. To achieve this overall objective, the assessment team will gather information on:
 - the scope of the landmine/UXO problem (location and estimated number of mines/UXO);
 - the implications of the landmine/UXO problem;
 - the in-country capacities available to deal with the landmine/UXO problem and the mine-action activities already initiated;
 - the political and security situation and its potential impact on a mine-action programme.
6. The assessment team will produce a report to highlight its findings; present its recommendations regarding the feasibility, scope and institutional form of a potential mine-action programme; and establish priorities to deal with both short-term emergency requirements and long-term capacity building requirements.

SCOPE OF THE MISSION

7. The assessment mission will look at the requirements associated with each component of a comprehensive and integrated mine action plan: mine awareness / mine risk education; information gathering / surveying / mine marking; UXO/mine clearance; victim assistance and rehabilitation; training and quality management; capacity building.
8. The assessment mission will focus on the contaminated areas of the country where the humanitarian impact of landmines and UXO is the most serious and where the security/political situation allows assistance to be provided. It will conduct its mission with neutrality, impartiality and humanity as required to achieve the objectives assigned.
9. The mission will be led by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and will be conducted in cooperation with the UN Resident Coordinator in country. It will consult with the local civilian and military authorities, with UN agencies (in particular UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO), with NGOs and the Red Cross movement, and with diplomatic missions and representatives, as required. The assessment team will make sure that it does not duplicate existing studies and reports where they exist, but rather that it builds upon the information already available.

DETAILED INFORMATION REQUIRED

10. Information on the scope of the landmine problem will include the following:
 - types of mines/UXO used;
 - mine laying and mine marking techniques used;
 - areas known or suspected to be mined, records available;
 - statistical data (when applicable).
11. Information on the impact of the landmine problem will take into consideration the following (when applicable):
 - national reconciliation;
 - the resettlement of IDPs;
 - the delivery of humanitarian aid;
 - settled populations (casualties);
 - reconstruction and socio-economic development;
 - health services.
12. Information on the local capacities available and the mine-action activities already initiated will include the following (when applicable):
 - local / national administrative structures;
 - information management initiatives and capacities;
 - mine-clearance initiatives and capacities (including surveying, marking and training initiatives and capacities);
 - mine awareness initiatives and capacities;
 - victim assistance initiatives, and medical / paramedical capacities to assist and rehabilitate landmine victims.
 - capacity for destruction of Anti-personnel mine stockpiles under Article 4 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.
 - capacity for reporting under Article 7 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

13. Information on the political/security situation will include the following:
- position of Namibia vis-à-vis the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and the amended protocol II to the CCW Convention;
 - commitment of the various parties involved to supporting mine action actively, and to desisting from producing, stockpiling, using, and transferring antipersonnel landmines.
 - position of the donor community;
 - potential impact of the security situation on a mine-action programme;
 - points of contact.

TIME FRAME

14. The assessment team will be in the field from 18 November 1999 to 26 November 1999.
15. A report detailing the mission's findings, conclusions and recommendations is to be submitted within two months after its return.